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West Facing East Facing West
For a long time now discussions on European identity have been 
deeply embedded in political discourses of the old continent. It has 
often been said that Europe has always been the idea present in the 
minds of the enlightened Europeans (not to mention rulers of holy 
empires), and that the present process of integration is only a natural 
realisation of a spiritual condition called European culture. Leaving 
alone the question whether it makes sense to speak of European 
culture in the times when the classical model of education has 
largely gone out of use, we nevertheless have to have a closer look 
at the origin of our contemporary situation and ask ourselves the 
uneasy question whether the Europe we are talking about here, 
the Europe of the last fifty years, the post-war Europe of market 
economy and post-colonial nostalgia has been, in fact, European 
at all.
In the most spectacular of senses, it has not, and here probably lies 
the origin of the problems the European Union has with the 
application of this unwieldy term “Europe”. For half of the century, 
it only named a relatively small part of what is geographically 
considered as the continent of Europe - “Europe” meant the west 
(and partly south) of it, whereas terms such as “Eastern Europe” were 
used basically as polite euphemisms. Such Europe emerged from the 
war as divided as it ever had been, and public conciliatory gestures 
were rather the expressions of exhaustion than any will to think about 
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the common future1. Yet, there was something new in this situation, 
something that challenged the old European loyalties and animosities
1 One exception was the popularity of the idea of the union of European countries 
in the late 1940s and early 50s in Germany. However, this “anomaly” can be very easily 
viewed as a particularly German discourse, since it allowed to skirt the difficult subject 
of German identity in the light of its recent past, and replace it with a dean slate of 
a European future.
- there appeared a limit against which all democratic European 
countries could measure themselves against and, by doing that, 
identify themselves anew. The “iron curtain” was something which 
every country had to include in its reckoning. No unity existed in 
Europe, yet there was a limit common to everybody, the limit which 
was not just a geographically placed border line, but a threat each 
European country took to be its own, no matter whether it directly 
adjoined the East or not. And this limit was not of European making
- Europe was provided with it by the two forces, which throughout 
their histories had, although in a very different way, rather uneasy 
relations with Europe. It was generally the United States Army that 
liberated western Europe, and, later on, established its military 
presence there with the creation of NATO, so Europe got itself back 
from a “foreign” hand, and got itself back not as particular countries, 
but as a relatively undifferentiated region of the world seen from 
Washington as its outpost against the USSR and its block. It was 
Stalin and Roosevelt, not Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer, 
who laid foundations for the identification of the post-war Europe. 
And the presence of Winston Churchill at Jalta only makes such 
conclusion more obvious, him being a representative of two seemingly 
contradictory attitudes at the same time: on the one hand, of the 
perennial British “balance of power” politics, of which the trans- 
Atlantic British-American proximity is only a historically developed 
form, but, on the other hand, of the “United States of Europe” idea 
that he started to preach when he ceased to be the Prime Minister. 
These two positions, although seemingly at odds, are actually rather 
continuous, since they, by means of establishing European identity 
with the help of the iron curtain as a common threat, end up speaking 
American English and with it identify Europe with American interests 
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as well - the only discourse that the iron curtain identity (which is 
another form of war identity) is able to utter is the language of 
confrontation between the two “empires”, and it does not matter which 
one is considered the evil one. Therefore, Europe, as far as it is 
Europe, that is, as far as it identifies itself as a certain common cause, 
adopts, consciously or unconsciously, the American identity, although 
in a half-shy and half-ashamed way2. And it adopts it all the way, 
including the counter-discourses that the American discourse bred 
within itself, as the European 1968 only too well makes visible (a mir­
ror discourse of world domination, which its professed anti-establish­
ment originators conceived on the world scale, this time in revolutio­
nary fashion). But how could such forging of a fake European identity 
have taken place so effortlessly?3 Why didn’t the European heritage 
so often referred to in political declarations resist at all?
2 Of course, there was always another possibility of choosing the opposite option, 
and many intellectuals fell for it. Yet, no matter how pathetic the choice of Soviet 
communism could have been, it was the choosing of another war identity founded by 
the iron curtain, and palmed off by a “foreign” hand, this time the Soviet propaganda.
3 The case of France, the most “anti-American” of European states, is a good 
example of the American discursive domination: to resist its discourse is only to emulate 
it (e.g. de Gaulle leaving NATO only in order to create his own independent nuclear 
arsenal).
It is not difficult to answer these questions. Of course, one should 
not underestimate the fear of communism, yet there was something 
more to it than just panic in the face of foreign intervention in the 
matters of the “free world”. We have already mentioned that World 
War II brought about the end of a certain European image, which 
considered itself the idea of the continent, or rather the world: the 
infinity of Europe that constitutes the highest peak of humanity 
progressing towards fulfilment of its freedom by means of total 
mobilisation of power, and overcoming all obstacles on the way 
(obstacles being very often heritage of other cultures). Yet, the 
paradox (?) of history that Europe had to learn as it grew was that real 
power does not find its limit in another power greater than itself, but 
that its fate is to destroy itself by means of infinitising itself. The 
mobilised power, whose aim is infinite growth, when it can no longer 
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spread in the form of conquest will find another outlet in which it can 
be spent. Since each society (at least a pre-mediatic one) has a limited 
ability to consume, so the power will not be canalised in production; 
instead, destruction will become the order of the day. The idea of 
infinity (of Europe) found its historical truth, that is, fulfilment as 
self-destruction by means of infinitisation4. The two world wars faced 
Europe with this knowledge and made it dumb. And when the 
tradition spoke, it either babbled in amnesia (“let us go back to our 
humanist roots”) or only did it to discredit itself - as the works of 
more acutely conscious authors, as e.g. Adorno, make clear - showing 
how the discourse of freedom is bound to murder. Therefore, Europe, 
when it identified itself at all, put its tradition under erasure and let 
the United States do the talking, fervently embracing its economic 
aims and popular culture. Yet, this was not an innocent gesture at all 
- it allowed two contradictory mind frames to be adopted at the same 
time. On the one hand, the experience of the painful limit (disavowal 
of infinitisation) is officially promulgated as the recent European 
profession of faith (the more or less peaceful deconstruction of 
empires was an exemplary sign of that). On the other hand, adoption 
of American discourse allows maintaining of a dear delusion: since the 
Soviet threat which grounds the common identification is understood 
as the world threat, Europe identifies itself on a grand scale of global 
politics, which might alleviate a bit the pains of diminished impor­
tance and power, the infinity of which came crashing down with the end 
of a certain European image that World War II annihilated. This way, 
the European identity of importance begins to shine with the reflected 
light, but one cannot avoid noticing that the light is quite uncanny, 
since the USA, as it has been known to us for the last fifty years, is in 
pursuit of infinite sovereignty and total mobilisation that necessarily 
goes with it - the same goals which Europe, at least officially, has put 
under erasure as the ones which had led to its destruction. Holding 
its tongue and avoiding confrontation of discourses allows Europe 
4 And this is, of course, a perfect incarnation of the tragic scenario of ancient 
Greek hubris (another name for infinitisation) - the knowledge present at the moment 
of European origin.
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to heal its imperial nostalgia in the reflected infinity it secretly adopts, 
and at the same time to maintain the “decent” image of itself.
The dismantling of the iron curtain, symbolised by the fall of the 
Berlin wall, is also the ruin of the European identity as conceived 
during the second half of the twentieth century. The event made clear 
the predicament Europe, the so-called united Europe, has to face. 
It has to ask itself the question avoided for so long out of fear both of 
the USSR and its own past (its own values that led to the hecatomb 
of the two world wars): can Europe keep identifying itself with total 
mobilisation (lately called globalisation), economic fundamentalism, 
and competition at all costs - all of which are the faces of the 
infinitising drive - and, therefore, pursue its political and economic 
interests above all else, taking the USA as its model?5
s The expansion of NATO towards the east in Europe would be a good example 
here - a pseudo-integration with the USA, based on the belated and utterly confused 
symbolic self-identification of the East against the non-existent iron curtain (that is, 
the Russian threat), opens a new territory and market for American military industry 
offering nothing but infinitising discourse in return (“you shall shine with our 
greatness”).
6 Of course, one can keep the old identification by means of “war on terrorism” 
doctrine, yet one cannot deny then the cynicism of such attitude, since - as the terrorists 
cannot be located precisely, they can hide anywhere - its aim is the formulation 
of a discourse that would authorise the USA to use force whenever and wherever it 
pleases. All of it obeys the old infinitising principle of absolute sovereignty, which 
always ends up as intervention abroad, although it is explained as defence of one’s own 
security.
If the answer is affirmative, it would, in practice, lead to turning 
away from Eastern Europe, as any attempt at integration inevitably 
means sacrifice of the mobilised power, if only in the sense of spending 
funds in order to raise the East towards the material and legal 
standards of the West, without which no attempt at any kind of 
integration will ever succeed. However, the matter is much more 
serious than just the problem of economic “sacrifice”. Europe faces 
the task of redefining itself as Europe, since the recent limits which 
gave it measure ceased to exist, and the comfortable American crutch 
can no longer be of help, seeming more and more both artificial and 
disturbing6. As the result of it, Europe must define what it is, on the 
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one hand, against the eastern or Asian inability to function democ­
ratically (this is nothing new, most of the modern European discourse, 
including Marx, is defined by such limit), but also against the 
American pursuit of total mobilisation and infinitisation present in the 
values of economic fundamentalism (globalisation), which, in different 
historical circumstances of colonialism, had been Europe’s own. Only 
in such a way can Europe actively and positively put its own tradition 
under erasure: not in the sense of forgetting it or just speaking about it 
critically (there has been enough of that for the last fifty years, and the 
main outcome has turned out to be the uncritical adoption of 
American standards in everyday practice), but, being mindful of the 
dangers offered by infinity, by accomplishing a revaluation by means 
of political and economic activity.
Eastern Europe may be of help here, if only Europe is prepared to 
redefine itself deep enough (yet nothing is less certain than that). The 
process of forging a new European identity can only make sense if it is 
not thought about along the lines of poor relatives uncritically 
adopting the values and institutions of the richer ones, which was the 
model of German unification. The West, if it thinks seriously about 
a European future, cannot demand the wholesale adoption of its 
values, rules and habits (even if they are sometimes uncritically 
applauded on the Eastern side), since Eastern experiences (which are 
multiple, because, of course, there is no one Eastern Europe, only 
Poland, Hungary, Romania, etc.) will also have to become the 
experience of the future Europe (at the moment largely incomprehen­
sible for the “old” European Union), but they cannot be accom­
modated within the remains of the iron curtain identity still domina­
ting in the West.
What might serve as a simple (maybe even too simple) example of 
the Eastern “problem” (if it is understood as something more than just 
backwardness of Eastern economies) is a completely different attitude 
to the European tradition operating here. Although the two world 
wars enforced a certain change towards it (“Rilke never seemed so 
alien to me as then, when the inferno of the war and occupation was 
over”, said the Polish poet and Rilke’s translator Mieczysław Jastrun), 
it were the red commissars who treated it as garbage or/and politicised 
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it whenever they could, whereas faithfulness to the heritage of Euro­
pean culture was treated as a means of resistance against the Soviet 
propaganda (also a kind of “popular” culture) and its use of both 
naked and discursive power. This, of course, bred its own form of 
myopia - Eastern literatures, from Josif Brodsky to Zbigniew Herbert, 
are full of wistful glorification of European, especially Mediterranean, 
heritage, as the Paradise lost to the East - but the fact remains that 
such “positive” experience of the heritage of Europe was another kind 
of truth European past found for itself beyond the iron curtain.
Is it possible to build a togetherness founded on such differing 
attitudes? The easiest way is, of course, not to attempt reconciliation 
at all, and advise the East to reform its old-fashioned ways along 
“postmodern” critical lines, denouncing European cultural discourse 
as a discourse of power (which it obviously also is). Yet, this would be 
a glaring example of the discourse of denial, the same discourse of po­
wer that is supposed to be unmasked, denying the existence of every­
thing that does not fit in its frame. The values upheld by European 
tradition allowed many people in the East to resist the discourse of 
power and therefore live through the period of Soviétisation as more 
or less decent human beings who did not have to feel ashamed of them­
selves, and the fact that nothing of this kind belongs to the experience 
of the West does not invalidate it as experience to be reckoned with. 
But what would constitute a way of reckoning, however?
For both “sides” the tradition and the identity that goes with it are 
the thing of the past, in the sense of being irretrievably lost as the 
unproblematic source. For the West, this would mean admitting the 
critical point of no return within it, the existence of a rupture (the 
famous “All post-Auschwitz culture, including its urgent critique, is 
garbage”)7. For the East, the rupture would mean the physical 
elimination of the bearers of this tradition (the “traditionally” 
educated classes) together with their material culture, especially during 
World War II (by nazism) and its aftermath (by communism). Such 
tradition becomes alien not because some better way of identification 
7 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: The 
Seabury Press, 1973), p. 367.
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has been found (e.g. the global discourse of American infinity), but 
because it remains inaccessible as a convenient interpretive machine 
providing us with a clearly defined identity. Such an estranged 
tradition, the altogether other of our global experience, is, as is the 
fate of every alien creature, at the same time the most unclean and the 
purest, both garbage and the holy, and it only depends on us what we 
will make of it. The Western and Eastern understandings of European 
tradition are both “right”, but the point has to be reached in which 
both of these experiences could be felt as continuous, not as mutually 
exclusive. This can be understood as a proper way of erasure of the 
tradition (which is both embracing and denying) in order to under­
stand ourselves as sharing such erasure of tradition or origin. Rather 
than identifying itself by means of the limit common with the 
superpower (superpowers?), Europe, to be itself, has to find its limit 
within itself by means of common understanding of the inevitability of 
such erasure (both in the East and in the West) and, at the same time, 
understanding that there is no common (“Paneuropean”) understan­
ding of such erasure8.
B Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, ed. P. Connor, trans. P. Connor et 
al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 69.
9 Ibidem, p. 60.
Although the erased tradition is the ruptured tradition, the tradition 
that abandoned its linear meaning (the “inevitable” laws of history, 
economy, globalisation, etc.), it does not mean that the erased values 
do not have anything to teach us (the linear discourse of, for instance, 
history is able to tell us a lot more than that it is just “bad”), and the 
first thing we need it for would be to allow us to make our own sense 
of what we do, even if it means a supposedly negative advice to look 
for a sense different from total mobilisation as a means of competition 
with the USA or the Far East. But is such an advice really negative? If 
we understand it as the instigation of passion for the interruption of 
infinitization, for something other than the will to power9, we will be 
able to grasp the integration of Europe as its effect. Such passion 
for interruption of infinitization might be seen as passion for sharing 
the limit with the East, sharing the limit that European tradition 
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constitutes for both of us in our different ways, and exposition (in the 
sense of being exposed and exposing) of such rupture to the rupture of 
the other. Such exposure on both sides has to stand behind “econo­
mic” sharing of the Western wealth with the relatively poor East, or 
the East will just be treated as a backwater of Europe, the exotic but 
filthy other, and the beneficiary of Western philanthropic fits.
The European culture that is being imagined here would not be 
primarily the culture of tolerance, in which all is fine as long as 
everybody minds one’s own business, because all opinions are con­
sidered to be of equal value10. What is needed is the culture of justice 
that engages the other, but not in the mode of telling him what to do 
to deserve praise. Quite the opposite - a just culture must demand of 
itself a changing of its ways effectuated for the stranger’s sake. Such 
a culture is called to accept the stranger’s difference as the constitutive 
element of itself, to redefine itself taking the other into consideration, 
yet not as somebody it defines itself against, but somebody to define 
itself with. True sovereignty is not the infinite one that is able to 
enforce its own interests disregarding the others, but the sovereignty 
which is able to sacrifice its infinitising drive for the other. This will 
always demand a lot of effort (which would, however, be of a different 
order than mobilisation of power), because the other, as a stranger, 
will always be at first perceived as destroying the stability of one’s 
world and therefore unclean. Such attitude of neither tolerance nor 
supremacy is demanded of both East and West in order to create 
a properly European future, which would mean admitting the limit in 
yet another sense - admitting that all meanings are local, that the 
fusion of horizons is the outcome of common experience11, and not of 
essentially infantile infinitization of one identity (both fordism and 
millenarism proclaim that history is bunk). Only the responsibility 
that is mindful of limits is able to learn, that is, to be guided by the 
experience of its own injustice, and therefore put its identity under 
10 There is a serious question whether a culture which lacks the hierarchy of values 
can be called culture at all.
11 More of it in Zygmunt Bauman, Ponowoczesność jako źródło cierpień (Warszawa: 
Sic!, 2000), p. 348 and passim.
144 Slawomir Masloh
erasure in order to redefine itself and use its responsible potential in as 
many ways as possible (and there will always be the possibilities that 
have not been explored).
Responsible culture is not the culture of overwhelming tolerance 
that brings all values to the level of private property bought and 
sold according to the demands of the market, and measured only 
according to the profit they bring, or according to the power they are 
able to mobilise (which usually amounts to the same thing). It is 
devaluing of such values (and the infinite global model that goes with 
it) that is necessary, because the only responsible standard of 
judgement is neither whether a value is traditional (such attitude 
produces dead past) nor whether it is profitable at the moment 
(forgetting of the past is sentenced to repeat itself infinitely), but 
whether it opens a responsible future (which is impossible without 
a redefinition of the past). Keeping oneself open to such a future can 
mean only keeping one’s identity open to responsible redefinition (but 
not the random redefinition of fashion or interest), that is, putting it 
under erasure (which does not mean forgetting the past identity and 
the values that go with it).
The initiated coming together of East and West, if it is performed 
responsibly, is liable to open such a future for Europe. Such future will 
not obey any of the contemporarily imagined scenarios whether they 
are terrifying (“they will flood us with their cheap labour and uncouth 
manners”) or glorious (“our life will become what we see in western 
TV”), simply because such scenarios are narratives of the iron curtain 
identity, the ones that we have seen realised during the last fifty years, 
only brought up to a more extreme level. The future, if there is 
a future and not just infinitisation of the old identity, will be neither 
terrible nor glorious, but altogether different; neither better nor worse, 
since you cannot measure the limit with the infinite measure. But 
hopefully it will enable a European future, which will be able to 
release itself from the uncanny American idiom12. Moreover, such 
12 Maybe the rift between most of western Europe and the USA initiated by the 
invasion of Iraq is the first sign of beginning to think this way, while the uncritical 
support of the George W. Bush administration by the East has sadly much more to do 
with our inferiority complex, caused by being looked down upon by the West, than with 
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future may have some meaning for the world, although not in the 
sense of becoming the world politics. If the coming together of East 
and West is a responsible work, if the “adoption” of the Eastern 
stranger ends up with a common redefinition of the limit internal to 
Europe, the redefined and open identity of erasure may be able to 
transform its relationship with other strangers both internal end 
external, that is, with the presence of the world in Europe (the 
immigrants) and for Europe (the neighbouring countries and cultures). 
Only finding the limit internally - as an urge to do justice to Europe, 
that is, to put its erasure (erasure which is not forgetting) to work 
- will enable an external opening of the fortress the European Union 
still imagines itself to be towards the former Soviet republics and the 
Islamic world, turned at present into another pretext for a grand scale 
global politics of infinity, as it is advertised on both popular and 
academic fronts. Wouldn’t it also be just in another, more symbolic 
sense? After all, as it was the case with the tragic experience of ancient 
Greek hubris, Europe finds its limitation as the second coming of its 
Greek origin (in the form of its written heritage) returned to it at the 
dawn of modernity by the Moorish hand. Then, whence does it come, 
this identity called European? Is it impossible to be thinking about it 
as yet another strange limit which would not be an externalising one?
any real support of American “war on terrorism”. It is not so surprising that the East, 
in its belated manner, only repeats the post-war infinitisation route of the West in order 
to somehow make up for the superiority with which it is treated - it behaves 
pathetically, but at the same time mimetically. The parting of ways between Europe and 
the USA seemed also to have a different limiting effect: Bush and his Defence Secretary 
Rumsfeld came to realise - belatedly, to be sure - that it can be very difficult or even 
impossible to handle the matter of Iraq single-handedly by the USA (and it is not 
a matter of the amount of soldiers employed), which proves that their politics of infinity 
is self-defeating.
